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Abstract 
 During the course of a natural disaster, affected populations turn to different avenues to  
attempt to communicate their needs and locations while emergency managers are faced with the 
task of making quick decisions to aid in the response effort. The decisions that emergency 
managers face are affected by factors such as available resources, responder safety, and source of 
information. In this research, we interview emergency managers about the 2009 North American 
Ice Storm and a flooding event in late April of 2017 to understand the decisions made and the 
factors that affected these decisions. Using these interviews, a list of interview questions using 
the Critical Decision Method were created that could be used to more deeply understand the 
decisions and decision-making process of a local-level emergency manager during a disaster 
response event. Additionally, animations were created to illustrate the comparative effectiveness 
of disaster response routing plans developed with and without the consideration of social data 
based on data inspired by a real event. 
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1. Background and Motivation 
Every year around the world, approximately 60 volcanoes erupt [1], 50 tropical storms 
reach hurricane status [2], 120 magnitude 5.5+ earthquakes occur [3], and more than 1200 
tornadoes touch down [4]. Between the years of 2004 and 2013, events such as these affected 
over 1.9 billion people, causing over 1.6 trillion US dollars (USD) in damages and almost 1 
million deaths [5]. Figure 1 and Figure 2 break down the cost and causality of natural disasters 
by the type of event between 2004 and 2013. 
 
Figure 1. Economic impact of natural disasters from 2004 to 2013 in millions of USD 
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Figure 2. Death toll of natural disasters from 2004 to 2013 
Situational awareness refers to how aware an emergency manager is of the needs and 
locations of a population that has been affected by a disaster. To obtain situational awareness, 
emergency managers must collect information about the situation on the ground during and after 
a disaster. Traditional sources for gathering this information in past disasters have included 
emergency telephone numbers, like 9-1-1 in the United States, and rapid assessment teams. 
These methods, however, sometimes fail to capture a comprehensive view of needs in a timely 
manner. Emergency telephone numbers may be overwhelmed by a surge in call volume, and 
rapid assessment teams may have insufficient capacity to visit every site to assess needs. Social 
data has emerged as an alternative information source in recent disasters. Here, we use the term 
social data to refer to information posted to social media and other crowdsourcing platforms. 
Emergency managers may enhance their situational awareness by incorporating social data, but 
they also open themselves up to the risk of possibly inaccurate information. Survey data has 
shown this risk has discouraged some emergency managers from using social data for situational 
awareness [9].  
Windstorms, 
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The 2012 National Preparedness Report from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
found social media has played an increasingly important role in disasters as a situational 
awareness tool [6]. However, the report also found emergency response organizations are more 
likely to use social media to transmit information than gather data. Organizations that restrict the 
use of social data during response operations forego the potential benefits of enhanced situational 
awareness that it affords. On the other hand, organizations that allow social data to inform their 
planning efforts report becoming overwhelmed with the amount of data, and being unable to 
efficiently use it [6].  
As an example of the overwhelming amount of information social data can provide, from 
October 27th to November 1st when Hurricane Sandy made landfall on the U.S. East Coast, over 
20 million tweets were sent about the storm [7]. A report from the Pew Research Center’s 
Project for Excellence in Journalism found 34% (about 6.8 million) of the tweets about the storm 
during this time period “involved news organizations providing content, government sources 
offering information, people sharing their own eyewitness accounts and still more passing along 
information posted by others,” and 25% (about 5 million) of the tweets were photos and videos 
that demonstrated the damage to affected areas [7]. The report found both text-based and picture-
based tweets were susceptible to be from past disasters or false, and users on Twitter attempted 
to point out any false images or tweets.  
While the volume of social data may be large, organizations have extrapolated useful 
information successfully. For example, in December 2012, the UN Office of Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs created their first-ever official crisis map solely from social media data in 
response to Typhoon Pablo in the Philippines [8]. The crisis map displayed the situation on the 
ground, such as damaged infrastructure or displaced populations, and the impact severity. 
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Social data can also bring attention to vulnerable populations. In August 2017, Hurricane 
Harvey hit the coast of Texas, and led some to call “Hurricane Harvey the first major natural 
disaster of the social media age” [23]. During Harvey, some social media posts went viral, 
bringing attention to populations who had encountered difficulties in reaching local authorities. 
One example is a tweeted photo of a flooding assisted living center that, after being retweeted 
over 4,800 times, caused emergency responders to move the center to the top of the priority list 
[23]. In addition to social media, sites like “Houston Harvey Rescue” were created by citizens as 
a way to centralize crowdsourced information about affected populations [24]. However, like 
during Hurricane Sandy, misinformation was spread during the event. For example, a report of 
an electrocution was posted on Facebook, but firefighters arriving to the scene where the incident 
was reported to take place determined the information was false [24]. 
Research regarding emergency managers and their use, concerns, and processing 
capabilities of social data has been conducted in the past.. One of the most comprehensive 
studies is the joint National Emergency Management Association and CNA Analysis & 
Solutions survey, which garnered over 500 responses from emergency managers at state, county 
and local levels [9]. Among the respondents, 64% of state, 42% of county and 44% of local level 
emergency managers reported having “enhance[d] situational awareness by gathering, filtering 
and analyzing” social data during past emergencies [9]. Additionally, over half of the state level 
participants and less than 20% of county and local level participants reported having a social 
media policy enacted in their agency. However, 85% of state, 83% of county, and 75% of local 
level emergency managers responding to the survey reported they “would not act on [social data] 
unless it was verified by a response agency or other trusted sources” [9]. This indicates some 
level of distrust of social data.  
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Social data has the potential to be useful during emergency response decision-making, 
but the potential benefits have not yet been quantified. Additionally, social data currently has not 
been widely adopted by emergency managers as part of their decision-making process. This 
thesis makes preliminary steps towards understanding the usefulness of social data for disaster 
response decision making. As a first step, the decisions required during a disaster response 
operation, as well as factors influencing how those decisions are made, need to be understood. 
Topics such as the allocation of resources (e.g., how does one decide whether a vehicle, first 
responder, etc. should be committed to a particular need?), the resources emergency managers 
have at their disposal, and the process by which information is or is not considered are of 
interest. Only with a strong grasp of the decision-making environment can we begin to 
understand how incorporating social data could influence those decisions. For simplicity of 
scope, this thesis focuses on disaster response decision making at the local level. 
There are two main objectives of this research. The first is to develop a set of Critical 
Decision Method (CDM) interview questions to elicit decision-making processes employed by 
emergency managers during a disaster response operation, with the hope that the questions can 
be used to further this research agenda in the future. The research team conducted exploratory 
interviews with a county level emergency manager and three city level emergency managers. 
The purpose of these interviews was to build content knowledge to inform the development of a 
set of CDM interview questions. The second objective of the research is to construct a set of 
animations to illustrate the comparative effectiveness of disaster response routing plans 
developed with and without the consideration of social data. To be consistent with the local-level 
scope of the research, these animations represent an event magnitude commensurate with a local-
level response. To create instances that may be encountered by emergency managers at the local 
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level, data from past local events was collected and analyzed. The events selected for the 
research were the 2009 Ice Storm in Arkansas and Kentucky and the 2017 late April Floods, 
which affected the city of Fayetteville in Washington County, Arkansas. 
In this paper, an overview of the organizational structure of emergency responders and a 
literature review in decision-making models is provided in Section 2. Then in Section 3, a 
summary of the events and information gathered from the exploratory interviews are provided. In 
Section 4, the two CDM question sets are explained and reflected on based on information from 
the interviews. In Section 5, the animations and their possible applications are discussed. Finally, 
Section 6 summarizes findings and presents potential future research topics. 
 
2. Literature Review 
First, the structure of emergency response hierarchy in the United States is defined. 
Second, a survey of literature in the field of decision-making models and eliciting expert 
knowledge is provided. This survey is meant to define what experts in the field of decision-
making models see as the current best practices for eliciting expert knowledge. 
During an emergency response effort, the Incident Command System (ICS) is used as a 
framework to organize responders. The framework is depicted in Figure 3. The ICS is comprised 
of five functions: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics and Finance & Administration. The 
Command function is comprised of the Incident Commander, who is the head emergency 
responder, the Public Information Officer, who relays information to the public, media and other 
agencies, the Safety Officer, who is in charge of safety of emergency responders, and the Liaison 
Officer, who is the “point of contact for… other government agencies, nongovernment agencies 
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and/or private entities” [10]. Operations performs the tactical operations, Planning creates plans 
of action and manages resources, Logistics is responsible for providing resources needed, and 
Financial & Administration tracks the cost of response including what can and can’t be 
reimbursed [10]. 
 
 
Figure 3. Incident Command Structure 
Naturalistic Decision-Making (NDM) “is a descriptive model which gives a detailed 
representation of how experts actually make decisions in the real world, using their experience” 
[11]. Before the development of NDM, researchers would create models of the decision-making 
process in a controlled situation where the decision maker was making the optimal decision [13]. 
NDM differentiated itself by focusing on how experienced decision makers make decisions in a 
time-sensitive, ever-changing environment. By focusing on how environmental factors affected 
the decision-making process of experienced decision makers, these experiential models would 
eventually be “accepted as the standard account of decision-making by most practitioners” [13]. 
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Inside the umbrella of NDM, there are decision-making models, and methods to elicit expert 
knowledge. For the purpose of this research, the methods to elicit expert knowledge were of 
most interest. 
The elicitation methods are often referred to as cognitive task analysis methods which 
“are used to determine and describe the cognitive processes” of people during the decision 
process [16]. The five main elicitation techniques that are used are: Applied Cognitive Task 
Analysis, Cognitive Walkthrough, Cognitive Work Analysis, the Critical Incident Technique and 
the Critical Decision Method [16]. Since the Critical Incident Technique and the Critical 
Decision Method have both been used successfully to elicit expert knowledge about dynamic, 
high-stake events, which disaster response operations are, these two methods were further 
analyzed. The other three methods were not furthered analyzed as they are not as useful for 
eliciting specific knowledge about desired situations as the Critical Incident Technique and the 
Critical Decision Method.  
The Critical Incident Technique (CIT) uses a semi-structured interview to elicit the 
decisions and decision-making processes from experts for non-routine situations [16]. To 
conduct these interviews, the incident is first defined, the interviewee walks through the timeline, 
and finally the interviewer uses a set of probing questions to understand the decision process. 
While CIT uses probes to understand the decision process of the interviewee, these probes have 
been rejected in favor of the cognitive probes of the Critical Decision Method [16]. 
The Critical Decision Method (CDM) is a refined version of the Critical Incident 
Technique [12] that uses cognitive probing questions during interviews to elicit information 
about decision-making in changing environments. The US Department of Health & Human 
Services Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality has defined a set process for CDM 
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interviews [12]. These interviews typically start with the establishing the situation the expert will 
analyze, then a construction of a timeline of the situation and of the decisions being made. When 
the interviewer understands the timeline and decisions, cognitive probing questions are then used 
to understand the decision-making process of the expert for each decision point. CDM has been 
used in the past to understand the decisions fire ground commanders make during operations 
[11], the debugging process of computer programmers, and the decision support systems of 
military operations [15]. While CDM appears to help understand at a deeper level the decision-
making processes of the interviewees, concern has been raised about the accuracy of the 
technique due to memory degradation [16]. 
 
3. Summary of Events and Exploratory Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with the Washington County, Arkansas (AR) Emergency 
Manager, the Fayetteville, AR City Emergency Manager, the Assistant Fayetteville Emergency 
Manager and an Assistant Fire Chief of the Fayetteville, Fire Department. These interviews 
lasted from one half-hour to an hour. During these interviews, the emergency manager were 
asked to describe any emergency events they had participated in, as well as their role in it. An 
additional interview was conducted with the Parks & Recreation Director for Fayetteville, AR 
about the process to set up shelters. 
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3.1 Timeline of the 2009 Ice Storm 
The 2009 Ice Storm in Arkansas and Kentucky is considered to have been the third worst 
ice storm in the history of the United States [17]. While several states were affected by the ice 
storm, Northern Arkansas and Kentucky were the most affected areas. The storm caused 1.3 
million residents across the United States to lose power, and over 300,000 power poles to be 
knocked out in Arkansas [17]. The storm also caused the death of 18 people in Arkansas and 24 
in Kentucky, with the reasons being “traffic accidents, hypothermia, and carbon monoxide 
poising” [17]. Specifically, in the Northwest Arkansas area, “over 100,000 people [were left] 
without power,” and almost two weeks were required to restore power to affected populations 
[18]. The storm caused almost $80 million in damages in the Northwest Arkansas area [18], with 
cleaning efforts continuing through the summer for some of the affected areas [17]. 
A week prior to the event, emergency management personnel in Washington County and 
Fayetteville had conference calls with the National Weather Service’s Tulsa office about the 
forecasted severity of the storm. These calls would continue up until the night before the storm. 
In preparation for the response effort, the city of Fayetteville took a variety of actions. The city 
created a list of essential personnel and reserved hotel rooms downtown for these personnel. The 
city also shifted personnel schedules to have 24/7 coverage. Generators were tested at the 
dispatch center and main offices, and fuel supplies were inventoried. Lastly, vehicles were pre-
chained and limits on the city’s credit cards were removed so that city personnel would be able 
to purchase supplies. However, there were a few lessons learned from the experience. First, 
while the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was allocated one power generator, the EOC 
needed two generators to satisfy its electricity demand, which was one factor contributing to the 
EOC not being usable during portions of the event. Second, the backup power sources for pre-
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approved shelter locations across the city were not catalogued in advance. It was discovered in 
real-time that some of the pre-approved shelter locations were inoperable due to insufficient 
backup power. Because of this, the city now has a list of prequalified locations that can be used 
as shelters and have verified backup power sources. 
In the days leading up to the event, rain saturated the ground making trees unstable. 
Around 2:00 pm on the event start date, the temperature plunged, the rain changed to freezing 
rain, and powerlines and trees started to fall over. As a result, the emergency call volume to 
increase drastically. By 3:00 pm, most businesses closed leading to a rush hour as the weather 
continued to worsen. Between 5:00 and 6:00 pm, power outages started and the concern of 
falling trees was elevated. The city of Fayetteville bought as many chainsaws as they could to cut 
trees that fell. During the initial response to the event, when utility crews were dispatched to 
handle a situation, like a downed power line, the street would have to be cleared going to and 
from the destination. Once nighttime came, worker safety became a large concern. Work crews 
would hear trees crack and fall, and if the area the workers were in was heavily wooded, the area 
either had to be served by a large crew or wait until daylight. Also, during this time Fayetteville 
emergency management contacted Washington County to help set up shelters, as well as request 
more generators.  
By the third day, Ozark Regional Transit (a local public transportation company) vans 
and Razorback Transit (a transportation service by the University of Arkansas) buses were used 
to transport the population, taking the place of ambulances which were used when not needed for 
hospital transports. On the fifth day, fuel ran out for the sanitation system, causing an immediate 
need for the system to be refueled. During this time, Fayetteville also started discussions with 
FEMA to see what could be reimbursed as part of the emergency response effort. The population 
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also started to go downtown as cabin fever was kicking in, however some restaurants were out of 
food due to not getting food deliveries from the storm. On the 7th day power was restored to all 
buildings within one mile from the city center, and power was restored to all populations by the 
10th day. On the 14th day all shelters were closed. 
 
3.2 Calls, Communication, and Resources for the 2009 Ice Storm 
 A Central Dispatch Center (CDC) is the point where emergency calls are received and are 
then allocated to the correct response agency (e.g. a medical emergency would be sent to EMS). 
During the event, the CDC was responsible for triaging calls by learning about the affected 
caller’s condition and supplies to determine their prioritization of need. Calls during the event 
ranged from vehicle accidents to fallen trees on property to health emergencies to people being 
trapped outside. In general, prioritization is given to any life risk before property damage. As for 
the order of prioritization within a group of similar calls, special consideration was given to 
vulnerable populations, but all else equal, the prioritization depended on when a call was 
received. 
 For the first two and a half days, press events were held on the TV and information was 
sent out on social media, but the population was not receiving the information. After emergency 
managers learned that the population was using radios, as radios are not as dependent on a 
working power source, managers switched to broadcasting messages over the radio, which 
increased the number of people receiving information. Once charging stations were opened at 
shelters and community buildings, the revival of mobile phone activity led to an increase in call 
volume and higher engagement with social media. 
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As for the allocation of resources, vulnerable populations were targeted with help first. 
The fire department was dispatched to senior living centers, and additional concerns were raised 
for disabled populations. Fayetteville worked with the local power company to make sure that 
the hospitals and shelters in the area were powered. Two of the most important resources during 
the event were fuel and generators, which were in short supply. Generators were needed to 
power essential buildings that were without power, and fuel was needed to power these 
generators, as well as generators for the sewage system. 
 
3.3 Timeline of the 2017 Late April Floods 
The 2017 late Aprils Floods caused flooding from Oklahoma to Ohio [19]. Rainfall in 
certain areas hit 12 inches within two days, causing historic flooding. In the Northwest Arkansas 
region, the storm caused power outages, and left many roads flooded [20]. For Fayetteville, the 
city received about 7 inches of rain in one day. 
Like the 2009 Ice Storm, emergency managers had calls with the National Weather 
Service. However, there was some level of doubt among local officials that the storm would have 
much impact on the area. As a result the staffing levels for response personnel were not 
increased. By midday, the area received about one to two inches of rain. The decision was made 
not to open the EOC. However, by 6:00 pm, the area received between 6 to 7 inches of rain and 
emergency managers had to call off-duty personnel to help with the response effort. Across the 
two days of response, a total of 80 people needed rescue in Fayetteville, with about 50 people 
being rescued from one neighborhood that was being flooded. 
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3.4 Calls, Communication, and Resources for the 2017 Late April Floods 
 During the two days of the incident, there were a total of 57 calls. These calls included 
responding to 2 structure fires, a gas leak, 24 rescue calls, 1 swift water rescue, 1 accident, 1 
vehicle fire, 12 medical assistance, 11 alarm activations, and 2 power lines downed. Throughout 
the event, the fire department had to respond to these calls and help blockade roads as the state 
Department of Transportation personnel were delayed in their response due to difficulties in 
getting to the affected area. Whether calls were for a fire or a downed power line, the fire 
department had to respond to the call, and in this circumstance, personnel were taken off 
blockade duty to respond. 
 A single shelter was set up for the event, however, the process had a few problems. First, 
the person calling to set up the shelter was in the field responding to calls, while the person who 
would help run the shelter had difficulties getting to the designated shelter. Once the shelter was 
set up, it was noticed that the pets in the shelter were causing problems with the population, so a 
separate room for people with pets was created. 
 
3.5 Social Data 
 During these two incidents, social media was used primarily as a push strategy (pushing 
information to the public), but was also used to gather information. For example, during the 2009 
Ice Storm, social media activity was used in conjunction with dispatch call volume and 
information from the local power company to learn about where power was out at, as well as the 
number of people who may be affected. A point was raised during the interviews that using 
social data and elevating a person’s priority from this data may both calm the affected population 
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and restore confidence in the response effort as it shows emergency managers are being 
responsive to the situation. However, there is the risk of observers viewing emergency managers 
responding to a viral post as just a political maneuver to restore trust in local officials. 
 Responders seemed open to using social data in response efforts, with one commenting 
that capturing data from social media would be valuable considering how the usage of social 
media has increased. One way that the responders wanted to use social data was to scan for key 
words that are related to someone being injured. This could allow for faster response times for 
these situations. Another use of social data responders wanted was the ability to leverage what 
the population was seeing with the conditions of infrastructure, as being able to quickly identify 
dangerous roadways and/or bridges would allow officials to inform the public faster. Finally, 
using location data (geotagging) from social media posts would allow responders to know 
exactly where a social media user was, and allow for responders to pin down locations faster. 
However, retrieving accurate social data is still a concern. Having a way to verify social data was 
viewed as important, with one responder saying they would pay for the ability to check for 
accuracy. 
 While social data would increase the situational awareness of emergency responders, it 
could come at a decline in the use of the 911 system. One responder emphasized that hearing 
and/or seeing someone injured is important, as it can be used to understand how badly injured a 
person is. An aspect of the 911 system which would be lost in an exclusively online system is 
reach-back. Having the ability to reach-back for the 911 system allows for an operator to get 
back in contact with a caller, and the prosecution of fake calls, and is a reason that information 
from the 911 system is generally viewed as trustable. If there was a system to reach-back for 
social media, information coming in could become more trustworthy. Another positive of the 
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911 system is that there is always a person on duty to collect the information, unlike social data. 
This means that information at any time can be processed on the 911 system, and the proficiency 
of operators may be better as they constantly interact with the system. However, an advantage of 
social data over the 911 system is the speed with which the information can be collected. For the 
911 system, an operator must have a conversation with the affected person, and the duration of 
the conversation is variable. For social data, there is usually a text post and/or picture someone 
can view to immediately gather information. To summarize whether information should go to the 
911 system or social data, one responder believed that critical information should stay within the 
911 system, but all other information could go through social data. 
 
3.6 Other Topics 
During the response to Hurricane Harvey, the volunteer organizations, like the Cajun 
Navy, participated in efforts to help rescue people who were stuck due to the flooding. While 
these freelancing responders mean well, they can also cause trouble as rescue operations can 
become dangerous. During two of the interviews, the topic of freelancers was brought up, and 
the emergency managers emphasized that if there are enough trained professionals helping with 
response efforts, they would rather freelancers not assist. Or, if there is a need for extra help, that 
freelancers should coordinate with response agencies during a response. Professional emergency 
responders typically study the area that is forecasted to be affected and know what is considered 
to be an acceptable risk, meaning they usually have a good judgement of a situation. Freelancers, 
on the other hand, could ignore risks for the sake of helping and in turn need to be rescued. 
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During one interview, the topic of PODs was brought up. A POD, or Point of 
Distribution, is a location that provides supplies and/or information to the affected population of 
a disaster. PODs can be classified as either open or closed, with open PODs serving the public 
and closed PODs serving a pre-specified subset of the population (e.g., a company can establish 
a closed POD to serve their employees and their families). For this interview, the discussion 
focused on open PODs and where they could be located. The responder talked about how supply 
PODs are usually fire departments or churches, but schools could also be used. If a fire 
department is used as a POD, then supplies can be moved across the city via fire trucks, and fire 
trucks could be used to transport food to homes in need during an event. However, for a fire 
department the staffing level may need to be increased as they would still respond to calls. For 
schools, information could be distributed by giving students paperwork to give to their 
guardians. Additionally, supplies could be sent home with students that are in a family that may 
be vulnerable to the event. While police departments can also be used as a POD location, 
negative connotations about police could prevent some portions of the population from using a 
POD there. 
When a shelter is to be set up, a series of phone calls from responders to the CDC then to 
the Red Cross takes place. While it is possible for a local government to create a shelter, by 
having the Red Cross create the shelter, the local government can relieve itself from legal 
problems. Additionally, the Red Cross typically has more experience than local governments in 
creating shelters. As to where a shelter is set up, for Fayetteville, there are pre-approved 
buildings that can be converted to shelters. Inside of the shelters, items such as cots, showers, 
medications, clothing, food, and power outlets are provided to the temporary residents. One of 
the biggest problems shelters face is the closing down process. While an event may have 
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concluded, there may be portions of the population that require additional time for the effects to 
recede, or may need help getting back home. The Red Cross can then get hotel rooms for 
affected populations, and help organize transportation for vulnerable populations. 
 
4. Critical Decision Method and Social Data Questions 
4.1 Question Creation 
As part of this research, a set of CDM questions that employ the probes introduced in 
[16] are developed, as well as a set of questions regarding social data that do not follow CDM 
structure. The questions can be found in the Appendix. During the creation of both sets of 
questions, the word “social data” was used over the word “social media” as during previous 
interactions with emergency managers “social media” appeared to be a trigger word that elicited 
negative responses, which could taint the interview data.  
The set of questions for CDM interviews focus on the decisions and decision processes of 
emergency managers during a response event. Six probing areas were identified, with some areas 
having sub-probes. These sub-probes were meant to further explain topics which may have 
affected the decision. For example, question seven shown in Figure 4 is asking if a particular 
decision is typical for the scenario, while the sub-probe follows up by asking if the responder has 
responded to a situation similar before. If they have responded to a similar situation, the previous 
situation may influence how they responded to the current one. For question six (about goals) 
and question nine (about options), wording from existing probes introduced in [16] was changed 
to fit the situations and for question eight (about situational assessment) an additional sub-probe 
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was added. All other questions were either heavily adapted from [16] or created using the same 
established principles.   
7. [Standard Scenarios] Does this decision point fit a standard or typical scenario? 
a. [Analogues] Were you reminded of any previous experiences? 
Figure 4. CDM question seven 
The questions over social data were created to understand how social data was used in 
past response efforts, as well as how the expert feels about social data. Unlike the previous set of 
questions, those regarding social data do not follow the CDM structure. However, the concept of 
probing is carried over. For example, question two in Figure 5 is exploring what reservations an 
emergency manager has regarding social data and has two sub questions that assist in 
understanding where these reservations are from. 
2. What reservations do you have regarding social data? 
a. Have any past experiences from yourself or others shaped how you view social data? 
b. Have any news articles or research shaped your view on social data? 
Figure 5. Social data question two 
The first two questions of the series are used to understand the organization’s policies and 
experts’ feeling about social data. This will yield insights into the willingness of the expert and 
organization to use social data in a disaster response operation. The third question is used to 
identify the experts’ past experiences with social data, and the process by which social data was 
included – or excluded – from a logistics plan or situational awareness. The fourth question 
focuses on how the type of data (traditional or social) and social data characteristics (time from 
post, location, type of content, etc.) affect prioritizations in logistics planning, for example in 
determining in which sequence to visit requests (i.e., route planning).  
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4.2 Analysis of Questions 
The insights from the elicited knowledge during the interviews allowed for the question 
set to be revised based on a stronger understanding of what happens during an emergency 
response effort. In reviewing the current question list, two topics seem to be missing from the 
decision-making sub questions. First, responder safety was overlooked. In reviewing the ICS, the 
Safety Officer is responsible for decisions made about responders’ safety, and in the 2007 Ice 
Storm, there was concern about safety when cutting trees in the dark. This led to a sub-question 
being included about responder safety. Second, during the conversation about the 2007 Ice 
Storm, there was concern about what could and could not be reimbursed, and what actions had to 
be done in a specific order to qualify as a reimbursable expense. Because activities must be paid 
for somehow, minimizing the cost of the response to local governments is a topic of concern. 
The question of reimbursement was also added to the basis of choice question. Finally, for the 
sub-questions about resources in the decision-making topic, resources were defined to include 
responders as a resource, as the number of responders is limited during response efforts.  
 
5. Animations 
 
Before conducting the interviews, a set of 6 animations were created. These animations 
contained 60 points, with the proportion of traditional data being either 50% or 67%, and the 
accuracy of the social data being 25%, 50%, or 75%. These parameter values were selected 
randomly and had no basis in a past event. For each animation, two different routing strategies 
were depicted, using the methodology from Kirac et. al. [14]. The first routing strategy is if an 
emergency manager plans on visiting all points on a tour, regardless of whether it came from a 
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traditional or social data source. The second routing strategy is if an emergency manager plans 
on visiting all traditional data points on the first tour, waits for each social data point to be 
categorized as accurate or inaccurate, and then plans a second tour visiting only the accurate 
social data points. For these initial animations, whether a point was traditional, accurate social, or 
inaccurate social data was randomly assigned. Concorde TSP solver was used to develop the 
routes for each strategy. For each animation, two counters are displayed which provide elapsed 
time and the number of people served. A screenshot of one of the animations is provided in 
Figure 6, with the top picture being taken before the animation ran and the bottom upon its 
conclusion. From the interviews, there was a desire not only to create future animations based on 
historical data, but to also find if/when a situation occurs when an emergency manager has the 
freedom to choose between alternative routing strategies for points that have the same or no 
priority.  
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Figure 6. Example of created route animations 
After the interviews, a new set of animations were created, modeled from call data 
collected about the 2017 Late April Floods. From the call data collected from the fire 
department, 57 calls were placed during this event. Of these 57 calls, 25% of these calls were 
false alarms or wellness checks, and 23% of these calls had no description about the incident the 
call was for. From this data, the accuracy of social data for the animations were picked to be 
either 25% or 50%, and the proportion of data to be from traditional data sources to be 67% to 
75%. While the call volume during this event was 57 calls, the animations created only have 40 
points due to Mathematica, the program used for these new animations, having difficulties to 
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animate instances having more than 40 points. The points selected for the animations are based 
on the Dumas TSPTW[21] instances, and are solved in Mathematica using the Clarke Wright 
algorithm for one vehicle with a capacity of 40. Each point was randomly assigned to be a 
traditional, accurate social, or inaccurate social data point. For four of the Dumas TSP instances, 
the instance contained 41 points, and the 41st point was picked as the depot. One of the instances 
contained 61 points, with the 61st point selected as the depot, and the 41st to 60th points 
eliminated. A picture of an animation is provided below in Figure 7. The animations are 
available in the online open-source repository Mendeley at 
https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/x8w9vzp4vx [22]. Table 1 provides the number of points of 
each type and the distance travelled for each scenario. On average, visiting all points on one tour 
reduces the distance travelled by 31%. 
 
Figure 7. An animation for a Dumas n40w40.001 TSP instance 
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Table 1. Allocation of Data Points and Distance Traveled By Animation Instance 
Data Name Traditional 
Data Points 
Accurate Social 
Data Points 
Inaccurate Social 
Data Points 
All Visited 
Distance 
Traditional 
First Distance 
n40w20.002 30 7 3 270 354 
n40w20.002 30 5 5 270 382 
n40w20.002 27 10 3 270 346 
n40w20.002 27 7 6 270 339 
n40w20.003 30 7 3 257 371 
n40w20.003 30 5 5 257 344 
n40w20.003 27 10 3 257 381 
n40w20.003 27 7 6 257 371 
n40w20.004 30 7 3 274 385 
n40w20.004 30 5 5 274 366 
n40w20.004 27 10 3 274 364 
n40w20.004 27 7 6 274 349 
n40w40.001 30 7 3 243 336 
n40w40.001 30 5 5 243 319 
n40w40.001 27 10 3 243 334 
n40w40.001 27 7 6 243 316 
n60w20.001 30 7 3 263 363 
n60w20.001 30 5 5 263 358 
n60w20.001 27 10 3 263 374 
n60w20.001 27 7 6 263 381 
 
For both animation sets, three assumptions were made. First, it is assumed that the 
population is distributed uniformly on an x-y coordinate plane. Real-life populations, however, 
are typically not distributed uniformly across space. Second, the animations assume that 
Euclidean movements are possible. In real-life, roads would be used to move from one point to 
another, and there is not always a straight path between points. Third, it is assumed that there are 
no expiration times on the demand for the points. During urgent situations, people can only wait 
so long for help to arrive. If it takes a long time for help to arrive, people may leave to try and 
find help or die.  
In one of the interviews, the created animations were shown to the responder. While the 
animations focused on the impact of social data on response time, the responder suggested that 
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the routing plans shown could be used for damage assessment and/or POD location. For damage 
assessment, efficiently routing vehicles to points of interest could reduce the distance these 
vehicles needed to travel to survey the damage. While the topic of PODs in this instance was not 
discussed thoroughly, the routing of vehicles to deliver supplies to PODs could be of interest. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The primary results of this research are a list of questions that follow the Critical 
Decision Method to understand the decisions and decision-making strategies of emergency 
responders during a disaster, and a set of animations inspired by collected call data. An original 
set of questions were created based on interviews with one county level and three city level 
emergency managers.  
In addition to the list of questions, the use of social data in emergency response was 
explored. In the two incidents, social data was primarily used as a push strategy, but paired with 
other information sources, could be used to supplement the information supply. Responders were 
willing to use social data as an information source, but accuracy of the information, as well as 
the potential for the 911 system to be less utilized, caused concern. 
Two future research topics were also identified. First, the traveling salesman problem 
variants may be useful for modeling damage assessment during emergency response when the 
demand points have uncertain accuracy. By minimizing the time needed to travel to all points, 
information about dangerous or concerning areas could be collected faster. Second, there 
currently are no well-established solutions for transporting affected populations during a winter 
event. Due to the needs of the population, such as wheelchairs or stretchers, transporting 
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populations to a shelter can be difficult. Given that few vehicles can be used in the initial stage of 
a winter event, transporting people in these conditions limits how many people can ride on a 
vehicle. This question, however, may fall more into transportation engineering and urban 
planning. 
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Appendix 
ORIGINAL DISASTER RESPONSE PLANNING QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this interview is to understand the decisions being made in a disaster response 
operation, and the factors affecting the decision-making process. During this interview, you are 
asked to think of one of the largest events your organization responded to in the last two years. 
We will first ask you to walk us through the event and your organization’s response to it, from 
start to finish, to the best of your recollection. Based on your description of the event, we will 
note key points in time when decisions were made. We will follow up with detailed questions 
regarding those decision points.  
 
1. [EVENT SELECTION] Our interview will center around the decision-making process during 
a non-routine event. It should be an event that was challenging, and one in which your 
expertise played a critical role, meaning that someone with less experience than you may 
have made different decisions. We are particularly interested in large events. Which event 
best meets this criteria? 
 
2. Please walk us through the event and your organization’s response to it, from start to finish, 
to the best of your recollection. By start, we mean the time your organization was alerted to 
the event, or began to anticipate it (e.g., a weather forecast). And by finish, we mean the time 
that the immediate response phase concluded and the situation was deemed under control. 
 
3. [CONSTRUCT INCIDENT TIMELINE] Interviewer reconstructs a timeline and verifies it 
with the interviewee. This establishes a shared understanding of the event. The timeline may 
be updated and/or clarified as a result of this process. 
 
4. Identify decisions for further probing. These decision points include times the interviewee 
would agree that several courses of action were possible, or that someone else with less 
experience might have taken a different approach. 
 
5. What were the information sources that you had access to during this event? 
 
For each decision point that requires probing: 
 
6. [Goals] What were your specific goals and objectives at the time? 
 
7. [Standard Scenarios] Does this decision point fit a standard or typical scenario? 
a. [Analogues] Were you reminded of any previous experiences? 
 
8. [Situational Assessment] Did you use all of the information sources available to you for this 
decision point, or just a subset? 
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a. (If a subset) Which sources did you use? 
b. Can any of this data you are describing be shared with us? 
 
9. [Options] What courses of action were considered or were available? 
 
10. [Decision-making] Were there any priorities (like first-come first-serve) that affected the 
decision? 
a. Did you use any software to support the decision-making process? 
b. Did time and pressure impact your decision-making process? 
c. [Resource] Did you allocate any available resources to respond to this decision point? 
i. Were there concerns at the time of making the decision that these resources 
may be needed at a later time? 
ii. Were any of these resources provided by another organization? 
1. Was there a certain amount of time you had with these resources? 
2. Did this impact how you used these resources? 
d. Were there any other organizations that responded to this event? 
i. Was there coordination between yours and the other organizations? 
 
11. [Basis of Choice] What course of action did you choose? How was this option selected / how 
were other options rejected?  
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SOCIAL DATA QUESTIONS 
1. Does the organization currently have, or is the organization willing to adopt specific policies 
that regulate the use of social data in disaster response plans? If so, what are these policies? 
a. Were there factors that affected the creation of the policies? 
b. How do you feel about the incorporation of the policies? 
 
2. What reservations do you have regarding social data? 
a. Have any past experiences from yourself or others shaped how you view social data? 
b. Have any news articles or research shaped your view on social data? 
  
3. Has the organization had previous experience of using social data in disaster response plans? 
If so, how important of a role did the social data play? 
a. Must social data be verified from an outside source (like an external agency or a 
VOST), before use? 
b. Are there particular characteristics that must be met for social data to be integrated 
into disaster response plans? 
c. Must a post from social media meet all of the characteristics above, or just a 
combination of a few? 
d. Are there any characteristics that would immediately make a post not be incorporated 
into a route plan? 
 
4. What are the sources that the organization traditionally gets data from for disaster response 
plans? 
a.  Does information from traditional data sources take priority over social data sources? 
In other words, do all of the data points from traditional data sources need to be 
visited before visiting any points from social media? 
b. Does the characteristics of that the social data affect when the data point is visited? 
For example, if a tweet is posted before another tweet, will the one that was posted 
first be visited before the other one? Or will the one that is closer be visited first? 
c. Does the type of post affect when it would be visited? For example, would a photo-
based post be visited before a text-based post? 
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REVISED DISASTER RESPONSE PLANNING QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this interview is to understand the decisions being made in a disaster response 
operation, and the factors affecting the decision-making process. During this interview, you are 
asked to think of one of the largest events your organization responded to in the last two years. 
We will first ask you to walk us through the event and your organization’s response to it, from 
start to finish, to the best of your recollection. Based on your description of the event, we will 
note key points in time when decisions were made. We will follow up with detailed questions 
regarding those decision points.  
 
1. [EVENT SELECTION] Our interview will center around the decision-making process during 
a non-routine event. It should be an event that was challenging, and one in which your 
expertise played a critical role, meaning that someone with less experience than you may 
have made different decisions. We are particularly interested in large events. Which event 
best meets this criteria? 
 
2. Please walk us through the event and your organization’s response to it, from start to finish, 
to the best of your recollection. By start, we mean the time your organization was alerted to 
the event, or began to anticipate it (e.g., a weather forecast). And by finish, we mean the time 
that the immediate response phase concluded and the situation was deemed under control. 
 
3. [CONSTRUCT INCIDENT TIMELINE] Interviewer reconstructs a timeline and verifies it 
with the interviewee. This establishes a shared understanding of the event. The timeline may 
be updated and/or clarified as a result of this process. 
 
4. Identify decisions for further probing. These decision points include times the interviewee 
would agree that several courses of action were possible, or that someone else with less 
experience might have taken a different approach. 
 
5. What were the information sources that you had access to during this event? 
 
For each decision point that requires probing: 
 
6. [Goals] What were your specific goals and objectives at the time? 
 
7. [Standard Scenarios] Does this decision point fit a standard or typical scenario? 
a. [Analogues] Were you reminded of any previous experiences? 
 
8. [Situational Assessment] Did you use all of the information sources available to you for this 
decision point, or just a subset? 
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a. (If a subset) Which sources did you use? 
b. Can any of this data you are describing be shared with us? 
 
9. [Options] What courses of action were considered or were available? 
 
10. [Decision-making] Were there any priorities (like first-come first-serve) that affected the 
decision? 
a. Did you use any software to support the decision-making process? 
b. Did time and pressure impact your decision-making process? 
c. [Resource] Did you allocate any available resources, including response personnel, to 
respond to this decision point? 
i. Were there concerns at the time of making the decision that these resources 
may be needed at a later time? 
ii. Were any of these resources provided by another organization? 
1. Was there a certain amount of time you had with these resources? 
2. Did this impact how you used these resources? 
d. Did responders’ safety impact this decision? If so, how? 
e. Was the cost of this action reimbursable? Did this affect when you did this action? 
f. Were there any other organizations that responded to this event? 
i. Was there coordination between yours and the other organizations? 
 
11. [Basis of Choice] What course of action did you choose? How was this option selected / how 
were other options rejected? If an action was reimbursable, did this affect what course you 
took? 
